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Abstract 
This article explores the role of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the international 
response to the conflict in Darfur. Both scholars and activists have commonly described the 
R2P in Darfur as a failure. However, a second look reveals a relatively far-reaching response 
to a contemporary civil war: Darfur hosts the world’s largest UN peacekeeping mission; it 
represents the first situation that the UN Security Council has referred to the International 
Criminal Court; sanctions have been imposed against Sudan; and significant resources were 
invested in peace negotiations. This article thus explores the puzzle of Darfur. It first 
establishes empirical facts by providing a detailed account of international engagement in 
Darfur. It then considers four conceptions of the R2P in the context of Darfur, arguing that 
the R2P as a ‘rallying cry’ for transnational advocacy groups provides the most plausible 
explanation for the magnitude of the international response. The third section of the article 
thus explores the mechanisms through which the transnational campaign on Darfur has built 
leverage. It concludes by considering the implications of the Darfur case on the R2P as a 
global norm and by pointing to some of its more problematic aspects. 
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Following NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo, the Canadian government set up the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to clarify under 
what conditions humanitarian intervention to protect civilians from mass atrocities is 
permissible. The Commission’s report attributed the primary duty of protection to states by 
virtue of their sovereignty.1 Only when a state proves unable or unwilling is the 
“Responsibility to Protect” transferred to the international community which has a range of 
measures at its disposal to fulfil its protection duties, including as a last resort, the use of 
military force. Consequently, the outbreak of violence in the region of Darfur in western 
                                                 
1 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: IDRC, 2001). 
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Sudan became the first test case for the emerging Responsibility to Protect – or R2P in short. 
As reports of mass atrocities started to filter through in the spring of 2004, a wave of outrage, 
fostered by extensive media coverage and vocal advocacy campaigns, swept through North 
America and Western Europe. These campaigns, in accordance with the R2P principle, 
demanded a forceful international response to the killings in Darfur. 
 
Today, the international response to the Darfur conflict is commonly seen as a failure. Many 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks have added their voices to this 
canon. According to Human Rights Watch, in Darfur, ‘the world’s leaders have failed to 
deliver on the promises made in the wake of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 that they would 
“never again” dither in the face of a possible genocide.’2 The assessment of the International 
Crisis Group (ICG) is similar: ‘the international community has conspicuously failed to take 
the steps necessary to protect the people of Darfur.’3 Likewise, a report by the Council on 
Foreign Relations argues that the violence in Darfur ‘is the most recent case of a state 
supporting mass atrocity and the rest of the world avoiding efforts to end the killing.’4 For the 
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘the very word “Darfur” now evokes the 
failure of the international community to stop war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
and ethnic cleansing.’5 
 
These statements are echoed by scholarly assessments of the performance of R2P in Darfur. 
Thus, Bellamy and Williams observe an ‘apparent contradiction between governments’ use of 
                                                 
2 Michael Clough, ‘Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect?’ Human Rights Watch, January 2005, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/HRW_Darfur-WhoseResponsibilitytoProtect.pdf (All websites cited 
in this article were accessed on 31 January 2011.) 
3 Nick Grono, ‘Briefing – The International Community’s Failure to Protect’, African Affairs, 105/421: 621-31 
(2006), p. 621. Other ICG reports provide a similar assessment: see ‘Darfur: The Failure to Protect’, Africa 
Report No. 89, 8 March 2005; ‘To Save Darfur’, Africa Report No. 105, 17 March 2006. 
4 Lee Feinstein, ‘Darfur and Beyond: What is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities’, Council on Foreign Relations 
Special Report No. 22, January 2007, p. 3. 
5 James Traub, ‘Unwilling and Unable: The Failed Response to the Atrocities in Darfur’, Global Centre for the 
R2P Occasional Paper, 2010, p. 2. 
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‘sovereignty as responsibility’ language to enhance their own humanitarian credentials and 
their unwillingness to take “responsibility-based” action in Darfur.’6 For Udombana the 
international community’s passivity in Darfur reveals a ‘crisis of humanitarian intervention’.7 
Similarly, Badescu and Bergholm qualify the R2P in Darfur as ‘the big let-down’.8 
According to Adelman, the response to the Darfur conflict brings to the fore ‘the huge 
discrepancy between the rhetorical success of the adoption of R2P as an international norm 
and the absence of practices consistent with that sweeping victory.’9 Likewise, a recent edited 
volume concludes that ‘the response to the Darfur crisis marks a setback for the idea of an 
international responsibility to protect civilians at risk of mass atrocities.’10 
 
Despite the near unanimity of the assessment that Darfur constitutes a failure for the R2P, 
there are reasons to pause. Short of a non-consensual military intervention, the entire array of 
conflict management instruments from the ‘R2P toolbox’11 has been brought to bear in 
Darfur. Accordingly, Darfur hosts the world’s most expensive and largest UN peacekeeping 
mission, even as the European Union (EU) deployed its largest ever autonomous military 
mission across the border in eastern Chad. Furthermore, one of the world’s largest 
humanitarian operations currently operates in Darfur. Likewise, Darfur constitutes the first 
situation that the UN Security Council referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
leading to the consequent indictment handed down against the Sudanese President, Omar al-
                                                 
6 Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’, Security 
Dialogue, 36/1, 27-43 (2005), p. 29. 
7 Nsongurua J. Udombana, ‘When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of Humanitarian 
Intervention in Sudan’, Human Rights Quarterly, 27, 1149-1199 (2005). 
8 Cristina G. Badescu and Linnea Bergholm, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big 
Let-Down’, Security Dialogue, 40/3, 287-309 (2009). 
9 Howard Adelman, ‘Refugees, IDPs, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P): The Case of Darfur’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, 2/1, 127-148 (2010), p. 127. 
10 David R. Black and Paul D. Williams, ‘Conclusion: Darfur’s Challenge to International Society’ in David R. 
Black and Paul D. Williams (eds.), The Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur (New York: Routledge, 
2010), p. 254. 
11 See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocities Once and for All (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2008), pp. 253-54. 
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Bashir. Significant resources have also been invested in peace negotiations. In addition to the 
joint mediation efforts of the UN and the African Union (AU), the United States, Russia, 
China, the UK, France, the EU – to name just the most significant players – have appointed 
special envoys to Darfur. As such, the international engagement in the Darfur conflict 
eclipses most other responses to contemporary civil wars in Africa and beyond. This response 
is puzzling insofar as Darfur does not offer compelling geopolitical advantages for the states 
involved. Neither are there significant natural resources or transnational terrorist networks 
operating from Darfur. 
 
Taking these propositions into account, Darfur poses a number of questions: Why has the 
Darfur conflict triggered a rather far-reaching international response? And what role has the 
emerging norm of the R2P played in this response? This article aims to contribute to the 
literature by providing a more differentiated assessment of the R2P in Darfur. It first 
establishes empirical facts by providing a detailed account of the international response to the 
Darfur conflict since 2002. The article then considers four conceptions that scholars have put 
forward to make sense of the R2P in Darfur and beyond: R2P versus Realpolitik; R2P as 
subversion; R2P as a more just world order; and R2P as social construction. Against this 
background, the article argues that the most plausible explanation of the response to the 
Darfur conflict is the emergence of a transnational advocacy movement. The R2P is relevant 
insofar as it served as a rallying cry for the Darfur activists. Thus, the third section of the 
article explores the mechanisms through which the transnational campaign on Darfur has 
built leverage. The conclusion considers the implications of the Darfur case on the R2P as a 
global norm and points to some of its more problematic aspects. 
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Synopsis of the international response to the Darfur conflict 
The international response to the Darfur conflict developed over several stages: in the 
beginning of the conflict in 2002-04, when the violence reached its peak, there was almost no 
international reaction. A significant response only emerged in late 2004 after the general 
public in western countries became aware of Darfur. International engagement in Darfur 
gradually became more forceful as the focus shifted to robust peacekeeping, sanctions, and 
international criminal justice. 
 
Absent international reaction at the outset (2002-2004) 
For many years, Darfur was a marginalised region within the Sudanese state given that it was 
long deprived of resources for economic development and lacked political autonomy. Starting 
in 2000, a rebellion began to ferment, eventually leading to the escalation of violence in 
2002-03.12 The early successes of the rebels threatened the control of the Sudanese 
government which reacted by arming an existing militia force made up of young men from 
Arab, mostly nomad tribes in Northern Darfur. These forces were then unleashed, carrying 
out a vicious counter-insurgency campaign aimed at destroying the civilian support base of 
the rebels.13 The violence reached its zenith between mid-2003 and mid-2004 resulting in the 
destruction of hundreds of villages of mostly non-Arab tribes, the death of over 130,00014 and 
the displacement of 1.5 million Darfurians during that period. 
                                                 
12 For details, see Julie Flint and Alex de Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War (London: Zed Books, 
2008); Gérard Prunier, Darfur: 21st Century Genocide, Rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); 
M. V. Daly, Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
13 Alex de Waal, ‘Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap’, London Review of Books, 5 August 2004. 
14 Death numbers in the Darfur conflict are contested. The US Government Accountability Office examined 
various sources of mortality data and concluded that the numbers of the Belgium-based Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) were the most reliable. CRED estimated that 158,000 people had died in 
Darfur between September 2003 and June 2004, of which 131,000 were excess deaths. (See US Government 
Accountability Office, ‘Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and 
Credibility Could Be Enhanced’, November 2006) 
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At the same time, the Sudanese government was negotiating a peace deal in Kenya with the 
Southern insurgents, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Promising an end to 
Africa’s longest and bloodiest civil war, international actors were entirely focused on these 
negotiations, as was the attention of the international press. Therefore, at the outset, there was 
almost no response to the escalating violence in Darfur, aside from the red flags raised by 
Amnesty International and ICG.15 Towards the end of 2003, Eric Reeves, a private activist 
from the US, denounced the ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Darfur,16 echoing Jan Egeland, the head of 
UN humanitarian affairs, who had said that Darfur constituted ‘one of the worst humanitarian 
situations in the world’.17 However, these statements remained without effect until March 
2004 when the outgoing UN humanitarian coordinator in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, said that 
Darfur was ‘the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis’ and that ‘the only difference between 
Rwanda and Darfur is now the numbers involved’.18 The inference that genocide was 
occurring in Darfur was immediately picked up by newspapers in the context of the 10th 
anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. Thus, from late March 2004 onwards, editorials 
about the war in Darfur multiplied, with many authors framing the conflict as genocide.19 
 
The growing media attention put Darfur on the radar screen of Christian organisations and of 
Congresspersons like Frank Wolf and Donald Payne that had a long history of campaigning 
for South Sudan. As a result of their efforts, in June and July 2004 the US House of 
                                                 
15 See Amnesty International, ‘Sudan: Urgent Call for Commission of Inquiry in Darfur as Situation 
Deteriorates’, Press Release, 21 February 2003; ICG, ‘Sudan’s Other Wars’, ICG Africa Briefing, 25 June 2003. 
16 Eric Reeves, ‘Human Destruction and Displacement in Darfur: War, Humanitarian Access, and “Ethnic 
Cleansing”’, 12 December 2003, http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article296-p1.html 
17 Quoted in UN News Centre, ‘Humanitarian and security situations in western Sudan reach new lows, UN 
agency says’, 5 December 2003, http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=9094&Cr=sudan&Cr1= 
18 Quoted in IRIN News, ‘Sudan: Darfur is World’s Greatest Humanitarian Disaster, Says UN Official’, 22 
March 2004, http://allafrica.com/stories/200403220078.html 
19 Within five weeks of Kapila’s statement, the New York Times and the Washington Post alone published ten 
opinion editorials about Darfur. On the press coverage of Darfur, see Deborah Murphy, ‘Narrating Darfur: 
Darfur in the US Press, March-September 2004’ in Alex de Waal (ed.), War in Darfur and the Search for Peace 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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Representatives and the Senate unanimously passed a resolution calling the Darfur conflict 
genocide. The “G-word” gave impetus to an advocacy movement in the US. It brought 
together human rights, faith-based and student groups under the umbrella of the Save Darfur 
Coalition, which was established in July 2004. In May, the US State Department opened an 
investigation to determine whether the atrocities in Darfur did constitute genocide. Based on 
interviews with Darfurian refugees in Chad, the investigators’ answer was affirmative. 
Therefore, in September 2004, the then Secretary of State Colin Power stated that genocide 
was occurring in Darfur – the first time the US executive branch used this label to describe an 
ongoing conflict – although he insisted that this determination did not carry implications for 
US policy in Sudan. European countries were a bit more reluctant in terms of semantics, 
although the then UK foreign minister, Chris Mullin, in April 2004 did say that genocide 
‘may have occurred’,20 while the European Parliament in September of the same year passed 
a resolution calling the crimes committed in Darfur ‘tantamount to genocide’.21 
 
Emergence of an international response (2004-2006) 
Against the backdrop of this growing preoccupation, the world’s largest humanitarian 
operation was set up in Darfur. On account of the substantial contributions of international 
donors, Darfur has hosted up to 13,000 humanitarian workers and one hundred relief agencies 
at a time since mid-2004. Their activities have concentrated primarily on camps for internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), whose numbers rose from 1.5 million in 2004 to 2.7 million in 
2008.22 
 
                                                 
20 Quoted in Chris Marks, ‘Sudan links genocide claim to US poll’, The Scotsman, 11 September 2004. 
21 European Parliament, ‘Motion for a Resolution on the Humanitarian Situation in Sudan’, 16 September 2004, 
http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_3810_en.htm 
22 Fabrice Weissman, ‘Humanitarian Dilemmas in Darfur’ MSF Foundation, July 2008, http://www.msf-
crash.org/crash/drive/b4d8-fw-2008.humanitarian-dilemmas-in-darfur.pdf 
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The first international organisation to respond to the Darfur conflict was the AU, owing to its 
recent commitment to offer “African solutions for African problems”.23 Under its auspices, in 
April 2004, the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government signed the N’Djamena 
Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. The agreement was never implemented, but it 
established the African Union Mission (AMIS) as a monitoring force. Initially, AMIS only 
had a few hundred peacekeepers; subsequently however, thanks to significant EU funding, 
their numbers increased up to 6,000 soldiers. Thus, AMIS went beyond monitoring and took 
on protection tasks, in particular around IDP camps.24 Despite its achievements,25 AMIS was 
eventually judged to be inept, as activists in the US and Europe called for a more robust UN 
replacement mission that could better protect vulnerable populations in Darfur.26 
 
Calls for a UN peacekeeping mission made Darfur a prominent issue in the corridors of the 
UN headquarters in New York. However, even beforehand, Darfur was high on the agenda of 
the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In September 2004, the UN Security Council set up 
an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the crimes committed in Darfur and 
more specifically to determine whether genocide had occurred. Its verdict was that there was 
insufficient proof for genocide in Darfur, but that the crimes that were committed were ‘no 
less heinous than genocide’.27 The Commission also recommended that the Security Council 
refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC. The US was at first opposed to the referral, proposing 
instead the establishment of an ad hoc tribunal for Darfur. After intense lobbying by human 
                                                 
23 Cristina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm, ‘The African Union’ in Black and Williams (eds.), The Politics of 
Mass Atrocities. 
24 See Paul D. Williams, ‘Military Responses to Mass Killings: The African Union Mission to Sudan’, 
International Peacekeeping, 13/2, 168-183 (2006). 
25 See William G. O’Neill and Violette Cassis, ‘Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and 
Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur’, Brookings-Bern Project on International Displacement, 
November 2005. 
26 For a critical account of this process, see Mahmood Mamdani, ‘Blue-hatting Darfur’, London Review of 
Books, 6 September 2007. 
27 ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General’, 25 January 2005, 
http://www.un.org/news/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf, p. 4. 
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rights NGOs and some Darfur advocates and in order not to upset its European allies, the US 
finally decided to abstain, thereby allowing the Council to refer a situation to the ICC for the 
first time.28 The ICC Prosecutor quickly opened investigations, but it took roughly two years 
until the Court issued its first arrest warrants: one against a minister in the Sudanese 
government, Ahmed Haroun, the other against a senior militia leader by the name of Ali 
‘Kushayb’. Although these people are not among the most senior leadership within the 
Sudanese government, Khartoum refused to surrender them to the ICC.29 
 
Meanwhile, international efforts were under way to mediate a political settlement between 
the Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel movements, principally the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). After the failure 
of the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement, a new process was launched in Abuja at the end of 
2004. The AU was again the main mediator, along with international observers from the US 
and European governments that funded the peace negotiations. The negotiations continued 
until early 2006 when the patience of the sponsors eventually ran out. Thus, an end date for 
the Abuja talks was set, while coercive ‘deadline diplomacy’ was used to persuade the parties 
to sign an agreement.30 The pressure divided the rebel movements. JEM and the SLM/A 
faction of Chairman Abdel Wahid opted out, whereas the SLM/A faction led by Minni 
Minawi, together with the Sudanese government, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA).31 
                                                 
28 On the European factor, see Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop 
Genocide (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 55-69. For examples of the advocacy push for the ICC, 
see Samantha Power, ‘Court of First Resort’, New York Times, 10 February 2005; Amnesty International, 
‘Sudan: ICC Must Be Allowed to Prosecute War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity’, 1 February 2005; 
Human Rights Watch, ‘U.S. Proposal for a Darfur Tribunal: Not an Effective Option to Ensure Justice’, 15 
February. 
29 See William A. Schabas, ‘The International Criminal Court’ in Black and Williams (eds.), The Politics of 
Mass Atrocities. 
30 See Laurie Nathan, ‘No Ownership, No Peace: the Darfur Peace Agreement’, LSE Working Paper, September 
2006. 
31 See Alex de Waal, ‘I Will not Sign’, London Review of Books, 30 November 2006. 
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Towards a more forceful response (2006-2009) 
One of the reasons why the US, the UK and others were eager to bring the Abuja talks to a 
close was their desire to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur, which required clear 
guidelines from a peace agreement. Most activists abandoned calls for a non-consensual 
military intervention, but they upheld the claim that external intervention was required to 
protect civilians in Darfur. A strong UN peacekeeping force with a robust mandate under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter was seen as the appropriate means to this end.32 The Abuja 
talks therefore needed to produce a settlement as quickly as possible – according to some 
observers, this mind-set led to the use of coercive methods at the expense of a sound 
negotiation process.33 
 
However, the Sudanese government was strongly opposed to a UN peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur. Khartoum only gave its tentative acquiescence after obtaining a series of concessions 
and, most importantly, when Beijing shifted its position towards the mission in the wake of 
the NGO-led “Genocide Olympics” campaign. 34 Thus, in the July 2007 Resolution 1769, the 
UN Security Council established the joint AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).35 The 
founding resolution stipulated that the new mission should be of ‘predominantly African 
character’ – a concession to the Sudanese government – and it authorised the deployment of 
nearly 26,000 military and police personnel. With a budget of approximately USD 1.5 billion, 
UNAMID was to become the UN’s largest and most expensive peacekeeping force. The 
                                                 
32 For an argument in this regard, see ICG, ‘To Save Darfur’. 
33 This point is made in particular by Alex de Waal, who participated in the Abuja negotiations as an advisor to 
the mediation team: Alex de Waal, ‘Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect’, International 
Affairs, 83/6, 1039-1054, (2007). 
34 See Courtney J. Richardson, ‘Social Influence and Peacekeeping Participation? China and the UN-AU 
Mission in Darfur, 2004 – 2007’, Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association, Montreal, 16-19 March 2011. 
35 It appears that at China’s behest, a specific reference to R2P was removed from the draft text of Resolution 
1769, although the Security Council did give UNAMID a mandate to ‘protect civilians’ under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter. 
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mission became operational in 2008, although it faced delays in the deployment of troops and 
equipment. 
 
The US, a strong supporter of the UNAMID mission, has emerged as the country with the 
toughest stance against its former Cold War-ally. Owing in large part to the work of student 
activists, Congress unanimously adopted the 2007 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act, 
which requires companies applying for US government contracts to prove that they were not 
conducting business in Sudan.36 The executive level was pro-active as well: in 2007, 
President Bush announced sanctions against high-ranking officials of the Sudanese 
government and companies operating in Sudan. Khartoum managed to offset some of this 
pressure by collaborating with the US on anti-terrorist matters. The extent of this 
collaboration is opaque, although it appears that the then head of intelligence, Salah Gosh, 
was invited to Washington DC by the CIA in April 2005.37 There were also currents within 
the administration that did not want to upset the implementation of the north-south peace 
agreement, signed by the Sudanese government and the SPLM in January 2005.38 
Nevertheless, the Darfur issue has prevented normalisation, resulting in a continued strain in 
the relationship between the US and Sudan.39 
 
European countries were somewhat less forceful than the US, although the European 
Commission has also imposed sanctions on the Sudanese government. These include an arms 
embargo as well as financial and travel restrictions for individuals who are deemed to 
                                                 
36 See Luke A. Patey, ‘Against the Asian Tide: The Sudan Divestment Campaign’, Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 47/4, 551-73 (2009). 
37 See Ken Silverstein, ‘Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism’, Los Angeles Times, 29 
April 2005. 
38 For example, at a public event in April 2006, the then US Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick, spoke 
about the need to balance US steps on Darfur with the objective of promoting the implementation of the north-
south peace agreement. (See The Brookings Institution, ‘Current Policy Options for Darfur’, 13 April 2006, 
transcript available from http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2006/0413africa/20060413.pdf) 
39 For example, Sudan is one of only four countries on the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of 
terrorism, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm  
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undermine stability in Darfur.40 Europe’s response intensified when Bernard Kouchner was 
appointed foreign minister of France in April 2007. Kouchner was active in the French 
campaign on Darfur and he took up the issue on his very first day in government. After an 
initial misconceived idea to enforce humanitarian corridors in Darfur, he proposed the 
establishment of a peacekeeping force in eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African 
Republic (CAR) with the aim of containing the Darfur conflict across the border.41 After 
much negotiation within the EU, the establishment of the EU Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR 
was eventually approved. It was deployed in March 2008 for one year, before being handed 
over to a UN follow-on mission, whose mandate ran out at the end of 2010. EUFOR 
Chad/CAR was the EU’s largest and most expensive military mission outside of Europe ever: 
it included 3,700 troops, 60% of which came from France, and cost at least € 800 million.42 
 
After the peak in 2004, violence in Darfur gradually diminished. As a result of the influx of 
aid, mortality rates in Darfur were brought back to pre-war levels, although pockets of excess 
mortality continue to exist.43 Intra-rebel fighting intensified in the aftermath of the DPA, as 
non-signatory rebels and their signatory counterparts, who were now allied with the Sudanese 
government, attacked one another.44 At the same time, banditry and attacks against 
humanitarian organisations increased, as did inter-tribal clashes. The AU and the UN’s efforts 
to bring the parties back to the negotiation table failed in 2007. The following year, the peace 
                                                 
40 A detailed list of EU sanctions against Sudan is available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf 
41 See Antoine Glaser and Stephen Smith, Sarko en Afrique (Paris: Plon, 2008), pp. 62-64. 
42 See Frédéric Mérand and Haingo Mireille Rakotonirina, ‘La force européenne au Tchad et en Centrafrique: le 
baptême du feu’, Politique Africaine 114, 105-125 (2009).  
43 Weissman, “Humanitarian Dilemmas”. 
44 Abdul-Jabbar Fadul and Victor Tanner, ‘Darfur after Abuja: A View from the Ground’ in Alex de Waal (ed.), 
War in Darfur. 
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process was taken over by a joint AU-UN mediator, Djibril Bassolé, although his efforts have 
not borne fruit.45 
 
The peace process was further complicated by the ICC Prosecutor’s announcement in July 
2008 to charge Sudan’s President, Omar al-Bashir with war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide. In March 2009, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the indictment and 
issued an arrest warrant against al-Bashir. Khartoum reacted angrily by temporarily 
suspending cooperation with international agencies and by expelling 13 international 
humanitarian NGOs from Darfur. Most western countries including the US welcomed the 
ICC’s decision, even as it obscured their relations with Khartoum. In the African context, the 
indictment caused a backlash: at the AU summit in June 2009, a resolution was passed in 
which African governments announced their refusal to cooperate with the ICC in the Bashir 
case. 
 
Despite the presence of a robust peacekeeping force, the situation on the ground in the 
aftermath of the southern Sudan referendum of January 2011 is volatile. The level of battle-
related violence in Darfur is relatively low, although it has flared up in 2010 and in early 
2011, as the government stepped up its attacks against the rebels. However, the conflict 
remains unresolved; inter- and intra-tribal violence has become more frequent; the majority 
of Darfurians still depends on humanitarian aid, while many of them are stuck in IDP camps, 




                                                 
45 See Julie Flint, ‘From Rhetoric to Reality: The Failure to Resolve the Darfur Conflict’, Small Arms Survey, 
January 2010. 
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Darfur in the context of the Responsibility to Protect 
The previous section described the international response to the Darfur conflict, which, as 
Mills noted, was contradictory at times.46 The following section seeks to understand why this 
response occurred. For this purpose, it considers four theoretical propositions regarding the 
role of R2P and assesses their plausibility in the context of Darfur: R2P versus Realpolitik; 
R2P as subversion; R2P as a more just world order; and R2P as a social construction. 
 
R2P versus Realpolitik 
According to a realist perspective, states intervene in far-away civil wars when material 
interests are at stake, for example to eliminate safe havens for terrorists or to prevent ‘rogue’ 
states from acquiring nuclear weapons.47 Thus, states do not get involved out of humanitarian 
compassion or a sense of collective responsibility and therefore, the lofty principles of R2P 
falter against Realpolitik.48 Worse, Kuperman argues that the emerging R2P norm creates a 
moral hazard, encouraging insurgents to escalate violence in order to attract international 
intervention.49 Indeed, realism has emerged as the dominant argument in the assessment of 
the R2P in Darfur, among activists, pundits and scholars alike. According to this perspective, 
in contrast to the promise of R2P, there was no meaningful intervention to protect vulnerable 
populations in Darfur, either because states did not care or had contrary interests in the form 
of oil or counterterrorism. Christopher Hitchens’ verdict is representative of many voices: ‘it 
looks as if the realists won the day in the matter of Darfur.’50 
                                                 
46 Kurt Mills, ‘Vacillating on Darfur: Responsibility to Protect, to Prosecute, or to Feed?’ Global Responsibility 
to Protect, 1/4, 532-59 (2009). 
47 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Neo-trusteeships and the Problems of Weak States’, International 
Security, 28/4, 5-43 (2004), p. 6. 
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Seriously: Objections to Humanitarian Intervention’ in Jennifer Welsh (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention and 
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004). 
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The Realpolitik framework is useful for explaining why there was no full-fledged military 
intervention to stop the atrocities in Darfur in 2003 – a measure that some observers believe 
the R2P norm required states to do.51 Arguably, the only country that would have been 
capable of carrying out such an intervention is the US, either unilaterally, as they did in Iraq, 
or by leading a multilateral mission like in Kosovo. Indeed, it appears that there were serious 
discussions about this option within the Bush Administration.52 In the end, the opponents of 
air strikes against Sudan prevailed for two reasons. First, a military intervention in Darfur 
would have been very costly, in particular since the US military was already overstretched by 
the engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, the gains from a military intervention in 
Darfur would have been minimal as Darfur does not host any terrorist networks nor does it 
have lucrative natural resources. Moreover, another US-led invasion of a Muslim country 
would have likely had negative repercussions, providing terrorist groups with propaganda 
material to incite further violence against the US. 
 
Therefore, realism offers a plausible explanation for what the US and other governments did 
not do in Darfur. However, it is much less compelling and even paradoxical in explaining 
their actual involvement. The US’ primary interest in Sudan in terms of Realpolitik is to 
ensure that the country does not become an operating ground for terrorists, as was the case 
during the 1990s when Osama bin-Laden was based in Sudan. A second consideration could 
be to gain access to oil contracts, the most lucrative of which are held by China, currently 
Sudan’s principal ally. A third interest is to secure the implementation of the north-south 
peace agreement, which is crucial for stability in the broader Horn of African region. The 
cooperation of the Sudanese government is instrumental for achieving all of these objectives 
                                                 
51 E.g. Williams, “Military Responses”. 
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and therefore, the most rational strategy would be for the US to foster a positive relationship 
with Khartoum. Therefore, if Realpolitik considerations prevailed, the US would handle 
Sudan in a similar fashion to its strategic relationships with, for example, Saudi Arabia. This 
was indeed the case in the late 1970s when Sudan aligned itself with the US and was 
rewarded with large sums of economic aid and military assistance.53 
 
There are elements of cooperation in the current US policy towards Sudan, which have led 
advocacy groups to criticise the US response as being too weak on Darfur. However, despite 
the geopolitical rationale as well as support for normalisation among the intelligence 
community, a number of influential Christian evangelist leaders,54 and potentially, the US oil 
industry, the general attitude of the US towards Sudan has remained adverse. This is 
exemplified by the multi-layered sanctions regime against Khartoum, the US government’s 
public support for the ICC indictment against the President of Sudan, and the continued 
listing of Sudan as one of only four states sponsoring terrorism. The Sudan policy of other 
western governments, such as the UK and France, are characterised by similar paradoxes. 
 
R2P as subversion 
Another critical appraisal of the R2P is offered by pluralist scholars. Thus, international 
institutions such as the framework regulating the use of force in the UN Charter as well as the 
principles of sovereignty and non-interference guarantee order in the international system. 
The idea of humanitarian intervention subverts these principles and it therefore jeopardises 
                                                 
53 See J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Requiem for Sudan: War, Drought and Disaster Relief on the Nile 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). 
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the legitimacy of the international system.55 According to Jackson, the destabilising effect of 
such subversion may even result in war.56 More starkly, scholars of postcolonialism see in the 
R2P a potential neo-colonial conspiracy insofar as it seeks to erode the very institutions that 
protect the powerless from the powerful. This perception is underpinned by what Chomsky in 
a 2009 debate on R2P called ‘the rattling of a skeleton in the closet’: the many cases in 
history when humanitarian pretexts were used to justify imperial interventions.57 According 
to Chandler, 
Opponents of intervention, mainly non-Western states, have been sceptical of 
the grounds for privileging a moral justification for interventionist practices 
and have expressed concern that this shift could undermine their rights of 
sovereignty and possibly usher in a more coercive, Western-dominated, 
international order.58 
 
A version of this argument in the context of Sudan was articulated in a 2009 book by 
Mahmoud Mamdani. He sees the advocacy campaign spearheaded by the Save Darfur 
Coalition as ‘the humanitarian face of the war on terror’ aimed at stigmatising the Sudanese 
government.59 The campaign itself as well as the various interventions that it fostered, for 
example the ICC’s indictment of President al-Bashir, served to weaken Sudan as a country 
and make it more vulnerable to external influence. In Mamdani’s view, the R2P in Darfur 
was thus turned into ‘a slogan that masks the big power agenda to recolonize Africa’.60 
 
Mamdani usefully reminds us that external interventions in civil wars are often conflated with 
the self-interested motives of intervening states. However, the premise that the R2P is merely 
                                                 
55 See Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty’, International Journal of Human 
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a vehicle of big power interests, and the analysis of the international response to the Darfur 
conflict as a neo-colonial campaign against Sudan’s independence, does not seem plausible. 
As mentioned above, if western states were primarily interested in Sudan’s oil, or if they 
wanted to bring Sudan into their sphere of influence, a policy of patronage and 
accommodation would have been more sensible. However, due to their engagement in 
Darfur, the US and EU countries have actually lost influence in Sudan, as the country has 
moved closer to China and states of the Arab League. Moreover, some organisations that 
responded to the R2P in Darfur – most importantly the African Union – come from the global 
south and can hardly be accused of spearheading a neo-colonial conspiracy. 
 
R2P as a more just world order 
Another proposition regarding the R2P is derived from liberal internationalism and the 
solidarist branch of the so-called “English School”. The central tenet of liberal 
internationalists is that democracies do not fight wars against each other, although they do 
behave aggressively towards authoritarian states.61 Therefore, in order to build a more 
peaceful world, liberals have promoted democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, in 
particular in states emerging from armed conflict.62 This is not far from the position of 
solidarists: order and justice are complementary and therefore states should strive towards 
greater justice within international society.63 Scholars from both traditions make a normative 
case for the R2P. Liberals appreciate the R2P for its contribution to a world based on good 
governance and human rights,64 while solidarists see in the concept the realisation of the idea 
                                                 
61 See Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12/3, 205-
235 (1983). 
62 See Roland Paris, At War’s End (New York: Cambridge UP, 2004). 
63 See Hedley Bull, ‘The Grotian Conception of International Society’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations (London: Allen & Unwin, 
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of justice in international society.65 For both, the emergence of the R2P potentially constitutes 
an element of a more just world order. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, most observers with a liberal inclination see Darfur as a 
failure of the R2P and describe international engagement in Darfur as too little, too late. More 
recently however, more nuanced assessments have come to the fore. Bellamy argued that the 
criticism of R2P in Darfur needs to be ‘tempered somewhat’ considering that ‘since 2004, the 
Security Council has been actively seized by the matter and has responded with a raft of 
measures.’66 Most notably, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans argued that 
the inability here to use coercive military measures does not mean that 
[Darfur] is a case of “R2P failure”: it just means that the international 
responsibility to protect the people of Darfur … has to take other forms, 
including the application of sustained diplomatic, economic, and legal 
pressure.67 
 
These accounts point to an alternative reading of the international response to the Darfur 
conflict from a liberal and solidarist perspective. Thus, the world community did more in 
Darfur than in most previous civil wars to address the plight of affected populations: 
peacekeepers with a robust mandate were deployed to offer some protection to civilians; the 
ICC was given a mandate to prosecute those responsible for crimes in Darfur; sanctions were 
imposed against the Sudanese government; much effort was put into negotiating a peace 
settlement; and a massive humanitarian operation was set up to secure the livelihoods of 
those who lost their homes in the war. In other words, the magnitude of the international 
reaction to the Darfur crisis could be interpreted as an imperfect, but significant step towards 
a new world order as outlined by the R2P doctrine. 
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However, two facts about the international engagement in Darfur contradict the notion that 
states have internalised the R2P norm. First, as described above, the world community only 
became interested in Darfur after the worst atrocities took place, namely in the second half of 
2004. During the most brutal phase of the conflict from mid-2003 to mid-2004, there was 
practically no international reaction. Second, states did not autonomously respond to the 
Darfur conflict. For the most part, they reacted to civil society pressure. Without it, it is 
unlikely that the US’ genocide determination, US sanctions against Khartoum, China’s shift 
of position with regards to UNAMID, and France’s sponsorship of EUFOR would have 
materialised. 
 
R2P as social construction 
According to the constructivist approach, systems of shared ideas and norms constitute 
important vectors for states’ behaviour in world politics by shaping their social identities. 
However, international norms do not emerge from a vacuum, but they are ‘actively built by 
agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behaviour in their community.’68 
According to Finnemore, the norm of humanitarian intervention, as articulated in the R2P 
doctrine, has gained salience in recent years.69 This is the result of two changes in the 
normative structure of world politics. First, the notion of who is human and can therefore 
claim protection has become universal. And second, the ‘internationally shared view about 
what governments owe their citizens’ has evolved so that ‘governments are expected to 
guarantee and provide a bundle of rights and services’.70 These changes have been made 
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possible by ‘an increasingly dense network of human rights norms, law and transnational 
activist groups that all persuade (or coerce) policy makers and publics to support these 
[humanitarian] interventions.’71 In this sense, the R2P norm provides a ‘rallying cry’ around 
which norm entrepreneurs can mobilise.72 Their actions are indeed crucial because, as 
Wheeler argued, ‘it is only through the mobilisation of intense pressures on the part of 
domestic publics that governments will be prepared to embark on humanitarian policies.’73 
 
Darfur is a case in point. The growing salience of the R2P norm is a necessary condition for 
states to contemplate intervention in a strategically unimportant region like Darfur. However, 
such intervention is not automatic, as the muted response to the recent atrocities in Sri Lanka 
demonstrates. Rather, it was the work of advocacy groups that put Darfur on the map. 
Specific platforms were created in several countries to coordinate the advocacy efforts of a 
broad range of NGOs. These efforts achieved a lot of resonance due to a favourable political 
context, but also because the Darfur campaign was malleable to the interests of different 
constituencies.74 The glue that held the different groups together was a commitment to the 
R2P norm. Indeed, the language of R2P was very present in the Darfur campaigns, which 
were fuelled by the activists’ outrage over the world’s inability to prevent genocide ten years 
after Rwanda. Accordingly, they demanded international intervention to protect innocent 
civilians from harm. Moreover, many well-known advocates of the R2P – such as Samantha 
Power, Elie Wiesel, and Romeo Dallaire – acted as their mentors. Not surprisingly, according 
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to two activists, the R2P principle constituted the ‘intellectual underpinning’ of the Darfur 
advocacy movement.75 
 
The movement gained considerable leverage and its lobbying was an important factor in 
generating international action in Darfur, as exemplified by the involvement of the ICC, 
EUFOR, and UNAMID. This claim is corroborated by the fact that the international response 
only materialised after the movement became operational. Furthermore, the states in which 
the Darfur advocates were most influential, namely the US, the UK and France, have shown 
the most significant response, even as they resisted calls to intervene militarily. Robert 
Zoellick, the then Deputy Secretary of State, said about Darfur: ‘I have dealt with a lot of 
foreign policy issues … and I am not sure I have one that has generated as much interest 
across a wide spectrum of Americans as this one has.’76 According to Williams, ‘one of the 
main driver[s] of UK policy on Darfur came in the form of activism from a wide range of 
civic associations.’77 In the context of France’s 2007 presidential election, activists associated 
with the Urgence Darfour platform elicited commitments on Darfur from all candidates. 
According to Roland Marchal, ‘Once Sarkozy got elected, he wanted to show some fidelity to 
the commitments he made throughout his electoral campaign. Darfur was one of these…’78 
 
The Responsibility to Protect and the Darfur narrative 
The previous section considered varying perspectives regarding the role of the R2P in the 
international response to the Darfur conflict. It concluded that the R2P was most relevant as a 
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rallying cry around which the interests of a diverse set of advocacy groups could converge 
and which served as a mobilising device. However, several questions remain unanswered: 
Why was the R2P as a rallying cry more effective in Darfur than elsewhere? And how has the 
Darfur advocacy movement achieved exceptional resonance in public opinion and among 
policy makers? To tackle these questions, the following section considers three mechanisms 
derived from the literature on transnational advocacy movements through which activists 




The most important factor of salience, both in public opinion and among decision makers is 
the narrative that advocates have created to frame the Darfur conflict. The story that emerges 
from early accounts in Western media paints Darfur as a place of good and evil, of victims 
and perpetrators, and of villains and heroes: vicious ‘Arab’ militia, allied with the 
government in Khartoum, commit genocide against the ‘African’ populations of Darfur. In 
order to save the victims and bring the perpetrators to justice, the West needs to do what it 
failed to do in Rwanda in 1994: to muster a humanitarian intervention. This summary is a 
caricature, but it does capture the main features of Darfur as an issue when it first appeared in 
the media in 2004.79 As the conflict in Darfur progressed and the common knowledge of 
Darfur increased, some nuances were added. Nonetheless, the main features of the Darfur 
narrative – genocide, Arab vs. African, and the need for external intervention – have 
remained constant over the years. 
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The creation of cognitive frames to raise awareness about an issue is a common strategy 
employed by transnational advocacy networks.80 Frames make issues comprehensible to 
external audiences and they encourage collective action.81 Thus, according to Snow and 
Benford, the more a frame is coherent internally and the more it fits the broader political 
culture, the greater is the ‘frame resonance’.82 The Darfur advocacy movement was effective 
precisely because it achieved exceptional frame resonance. Two factors pertaining to the 
Darfur narrative are relevant in this regard. First, the narrative describes the Darfur conflict in 
morally unambiguous terms. In the accounts of activists, there is absolute clarity about good 
and evil and about the identities of victims and perpetrators. They made few attempts to shed 
light on the complex causes of the Darfur conflict and instead explained violence as the 
projection of evil. Not surprisingly therefore, the activist narrative drew criticisms from long-
time Darfur experts. Julie Flint, for example, complained that for the activists ‘Darfur is not a 
place with a complex history; it is a moral high ground.’83 In spite of this, the Darfur 
narrative proved to be compelling for the broader public. It offered an easy explanation of the 
war and aroused a lot of sympathy for the victims. 
 
The second factor contributing to the resonance of the Darfur narrative is closely related to 
the R2P doctrine. The narrative suggests that external intervention is the remedy to ‘save 
Darfur’. In the early days of activism, a number of advocates spoke about the need for a non-
consensual military intervention,84 although many subsequently moderated their stance and 
demanded a robust peacekeeping mission instead. Evidently, the emphasis on external 
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intervention reflects the R2P doctrine which prescribes this course of action when mass 
atrocities are ongoing and the home government is unable or, as in the case of Sudan, 
unwilling to stop them. The Darfur narrative thus put Western countries in the role of the 
saviours, as their power can potentially be used for a good moral purpose. This frame struck a 
chord among decision makers, in particular in the US, whose moral leadership was 
questioned in the context of the 2003 Iraq invasion. A tough stance on Darfur provided an 
opportunity to reclaim the moral high ground and as a result, both Democrats and 
Republicans, embraced Darfur as a cause. Likewise, Sarkozy and Kouchner saw intervention 
in the Darfur conflict as an opportunity to reaffirm France’s moral leadership in the world. 
 
Grafting 
A second mechanism through which Darfur activists have built leverage is related to what 
Price has termed ‘grafting’: the association of a new norm with a pre-existing broadly 
accepted norm.85 As argued above, the campaign for Darfur represents an attempt to put the 
R2P norm into practice. Associations were established with two related normative 
constellations. First, Darfur advocates linked their campaign to the anti-genocide norm. 
Enshrined in the 1948 Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as acts committed with 
the intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, this norm stipulates that 
states have a duty to prevent the commission of genocide as well as to punish its perpetrators. 
Thus, anti-genocide and R2P norms are natural allies since they both prescribe action to stop 
atrocities that constitute genocide. In the case of Darfur, a link between the two norms was 
created by framing the conflict as genocide. Indeed, since Powell’s declaration, Darfur 
advocates have insisted on the ‘G-word’, brushing away discussions about whether Darfur 
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really constitutes genocide and whether the genocide actually ended when the violence 
diminished after 2004.86 
 
The effect of the grafting was that many supporters of the anti-genocide norm have become 
keen advocates of international intervention in Darfur. Samantha Power, whose 2002 book A 
Problem from Hell87 was instrumental in popularising the anti-genocide norm, was active 
from the outset in the Darfur advocacy movement. She served as an advisor and mentor to 
student activists, and her own field research-based report about the atrocities in Darfur had a 
significant impact on the nascent Darfur activist movement.88 Several student leaders refer to 
Power’s book as the ‘bible’ of student activism for Darfur.89 
 
Another icon of the movement to prevent genocide was Holocaust survivor and Nobel Peace 
Laureate Elie Wiesel who spoke frequently about the war in Darfur and participated in the 
founding meeting of the Save Darfur Coalition. His engagement created buy-in among many 
Jewish organisations that got involved in the grassroots mobilisation around Darfur. The 
Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington DC played a particularly important role in 
raising awareness about Darfur. The Museum had its own outreach activities, and it provided 
support for student activists that spearheaded Darfur campaigns on college campuses all over 
the US.90 
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Second, the campaign built leverage by grafting the Darfur issue on existing global justice 
norms. This refers to the idea that people who committed acts qualifying as war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, or genocide must be held accountable regardless of when and where 
these crimes took place. There is of course an intrinsic link between global justice norms and 
the R2P doctrine, which includes judicial measures as part of its prevention and 
reconstruction agenda. From the outset, Darfur advocates demanded that perpetrators of 
genocide in Sudan be brought to justice. Such claims were picked up by established human 
rights organisations. Some of them, for example Amnesty International and Human Rights 
First, joined the Save Darfur Coalition, adding legitimacy and resources to the Darfur 
campaign as a result. 
 
Invoking analogies 
The third mechanism of resonance is related to what Keck and Sikkink called ‘accountability 
politics’: efforts by transnational advocacy networks to build support for their cause by 
‘hold[ing] power actors to their previously stated policies and principles.’91 In the case of 
Darfur, this consisted of invoking analogies between the Darfur conflict and the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994, thereby reminding policy makers of the promises they had made in its 
aftermath. This fell on particularly fertile grounds in the US, where many policy makers have 
expressed remorse over their failure to act on Rwanda.92 During a 1998 visit to Kigali, then 
US President Bill Clinton summarised the lessons of Rwanda as follows: ‘The international 
community ... must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy. We did not act quickly 
enough after the killing began ... We did not immediately call these crimes by their rightful 
name: genocide.’93 This lesson was of course central to the emergence of the R2P, premised 
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on the conviction that if atrocities as horrific as those in Rwanda were to happen again, 
forceful action must be taken to stop them.  
 
From the very beginning of the Darfur advocacy movement – in fact, since Kapila’s 
statement in March 2004 – Darfur was framed as ‘another Rwanda.’ It therefore became a 
test case for the many commitments of ‘never again’ that states readily asserted after 
Rwanda.94 The effect of the Darfur-Rwanda analogy was twofold: one was that it stimulated 
media attention. Liberal pundits, such as Nicholas Kristof from the New York Times started to 
write prolifically about the Darfur conflict after Kapila’s whistle-blowing. 
 
The second effect of the Darfur-Rwanda analogy was felt at the decision-making level. Some 
of the most active promoters of international engagement in Darfur were senior officials 
whose personal experiences in the context of the Rwandan genocide left a strong mark. For 
example, Kofi Annan’s role as the head of UN peacekeeping during the Rwandan genocide 
has been critically scrutinised, and Annan has since been an ardent supporter of humanitarian 
intervention.95 From early on, Annan spoke forcefully about Darfur and personally made sure 
it was given top priority within the UN Secretariat.96 Susan Rice, the current US Ambassador 
to the UN, who was on Bill Clinton’s National Security Council staff in 1994, was 
particularly pro-active on Darfur. In an opinion-editorial of May 2004, admitting that she 
remains ‘haunted by the Rwanda genocide’, Rice called for military intervention in Darfur. 97 
Later, she continued to advocate for tough action against the Sudanese government.98 Bernard 
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Kouchner, who was instrumental for France’s involvement in Darfur, also has a personal 
connection to Rwanda. During the genocide, Kouchner travelled to Kigali to airlift orphans 
back to France and he strongly supported his country’s military mission in June 1994. For 
Kouchner, the world’s failure to stop the Rwandan genocide represents ‘the childhood sins of 
the right of ingérence’.99 Mukesh Kapila, the first person to call Darfur genocide, was marked 
by his experience as one of the first British government officials to visit Rwanda after the 
genocide in 1994.100 Finally, Roméo Dallaire, the famous force commander of the ill-fated 
UN peacekeeping mission during the Rwandan genocide, became an active campaigner for 
Darfur. In fact, Dallaire’s editorial ‘Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda’ played an important 
role in popularising the Darfur-Rwanda analogy.101 These personalities exemplify the power 
of invoking analogies: they perceived resolute action over Darfur as a form of redemption for 




Why has the conflict in Darfur triggered a far-reaching international response, and what role 
did the emerging norm of the R2P play in shaping this response? This article has argued that 
the magnitude of international engagement in Darfur was made possible by the evolution of 
normative structures, shifting the borders of legitimacy away from non-interference towards 
responsibility. The response actually materialised when civil society networks tapped into 
this structure and used the R2P norm as a rallying cry to persuade states to do something to 
alleviate the suffering of people in Darfur. The campaign for Darfur achieved exceptional 
resonance, both with public opinion and among policy makers. This resonance stemmed from 
                                                 
99 Quoted in James Traub, ‘A Statesman without Border’, New York Times Magazine. 3 February 2008. 
100 Kapila provides a personal testimony in the film “Moving from Words to Action: The Responsibility to 
Protect”, http://www.aegistrust.org/Films/moving-from-words-to-action-the-responsibility-to-protect.html 
101 Romeo Dallaire, ‘Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda’, New York Times. 4 October 2004. 
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the political strategies of Darfur advocates, including the framing of the Darfur conflict in 
clear moral and political categories; the grafting of Darfur to existing anti-genocide norms; 
and the invocation of analogies between the war in Darfur and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
 
What does Darfur tell us about the current state of the R2P? First, compared to other civil 
wars, the international response to the Darfur conflict constitutes a relatively ambitious 
implementation of the R2P doctrine. One conclusion, therefore, is that the R2P is no longer 
purely aspirational, but has gained practical relevance. Second, Darfur shows that the 
function of the R2P as a rallying cry for transnational activism has potential. Thus, the R2P’s 
normative content appears to be at least as significant as the very broad policy platform that it 
sets out. Considering these two factors, why is the R2P in Darfur so commonly described as a 
failure? One explanation is the R2P has not yet emancipated itself from the idea of military 
humanitarian intervention, despite affirmations to the contrary by advocates and policy 
makers. Many of them remain stuck in a logic that considers anything less than NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo as failure, even though the R2P doctrine actually emphasises non-
military instruments of conflict prevention. 
 
Another reason is that Darfur is not, evidently, a success for the R2P. The international 
community only started paying attention to the Darfur conflict when the majority of the 
atrocities had already happened. Moreover, the interventions that did take place failed to 
significantly improve the situation of Darfurians on the ground. Humanitarian access has 
improved and the presence of international actors presumably has a certain deterrence effect, 
but there is no doubt that civilians in Darfur remain intensely vulnerable. It is easy to blame 
these failures on the lack of “political will” to intervene more forcefully. Less convenient is 
the realisation that the R2P doctrine itself, and the different interventions it inspired, had 
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problematic consequences in Darfur. Thus, according to de Waal, the insistence of Darfur 
activists on military intervention has crowded out political strategies to solve the crisis 
through peace negotiations.102 Similarly, Belloni has argued that the R2P provided an 
incentive for the Darfur rebels to escalate their struggle, hoping that such action would lead to 
the desired external intervention.103 Likewise, a number of observers have pointed to the 
ambiguous impact of the ICC indictments against the Sudanese President.104 Finally, some 
civil society representatives from Darfur are highly critical of UNAMID given the mission’s 
collaboration with the Sudanese government. An assessment of the merits of these arguments 
is beyond the scope of this paper. They do, however, remind us that when it comes to the 
impact of the R2P, in Darfur and beyond, it is best to shed the simplistic language of success 
and failure. 
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